The complexity of motivation that results in the decision to study and practice psychiatry probably makes it impossible for the doctor who so chooses, to analyse it in all its details. A psychoanalysis may provide understanding though not necessarily a complete one. Amongst the more immediate influences in my own case, as far as I am able to judge it, was a period of general practice just after I graduated. Nothing in my training prepared me for problems such as devising suitable treatment for a young giant of a man with severe chronic bronchitis who ultimately disclosed he was smoking 100-200 cigarettes a day. Other clinical experiences in a variety of circumstances turned up many other problems for which I was quite unprepared.
Finally I decided to train in psychiatry which seemed the best way to acquire the skills to help patients whose difficulties challenged me most. In retrospect, and with the somewhat increased degree of self-awareness I think I now possess, I realise it was by no means a rational decision. Before embarking on training I took the seemingly appropriate steps of reading in the subject, asking psychiatrists what they did, and visiting clinics and hospitals devoted to psychiatric treatment. But these were mostly a smoke-screen. I did not understand I had a hang-up on the ideal of devoting my efforts to those patients who generally got short shrift from their doctors as soon as psychological factors were perceived as being the main aetiology for their clinical problems and symptoms. Altruism rarely exists in an unalloyed state. Self-interest and gratification are almost invariably to be *Received IS November 1974. **Professor and Chairman, Department of Psychological Medicine, Monash University, Victoria. discovered behind apparent selflessness. But, it certainly never crossed my mind then, and I find it foreign when contemplating it now, that I was about to embark on a career that would make me, in the eyes of some radical groups, an ephor of an authoritarian society that used the myth of mental illness, arranged the manufacture of madness, and confused ideology and insanity (Szasz, 1961 (Szasz, , 1970 (Szasz, , 1971 to oppress and bring into line those who deviated from its mores.
The Anti-Psychiatry Stmeotype
When I started training in psychiatry I began to be the recipient of what I regard is the most potent and persistent anti-psychiatry process of our time.
This is the stereotype evoked, and it virtually amounts to a hallmark of the medical profession, by psychological aetiology in patients and its generalisation to those involved in the treatment and management of patients whose illnesses are regarded as psychological or pychiatric. (Perhaps my selection of psychiatry as a career was a reversal of the stereotype in myself with counterphobic implications.)
The stereotype has three dominant features. Firstly, psychological aetiology is denied as witness the woman who over a period of years repeatedly exsanguinated herself through bleeding per rectum. Apart from innumerable units of blood for emergency treatments during that time she was exhaustively examined again and again without any cause being discovered except traumatic inflammation and lacerations of the lower rectal mucosa. This could only be compatible with self-inflicted injury. After having been attended by a long series of physicians and surgeons, she was ultimately referred for psychiatric opinion by a ruse. Predictably she was enraged when she discovered what had been done and quickly removed herself from the psychiatric milieu.
Secondly, if denial fails, is rejection. This is illustrated by the man who spent a year in a surgical admitting ward because his operative wound kept breaking down and becoming infected. The surgeon, in due course, proved to himself that self-inflicted injury to the wound was the cause.
When he could put u p with it no longer he discharged the patient. The following day the patient presented at the Casualty Department and was noted to be deeply depressed. But when admitted to a psychiatric unit he promptly discharged himself. A few days later he attempted rape. Whilst held in remand by the police after being charged he committed suicide. To my mind it is understandable that psychiatrists, and other professionals in the mental health area, become sensitive to, and are frustrated by the antipsychiatry stereotype. Many circumstances will determine the manner in which they deal with their reactions. Extremism may be one of them, and thus I d o not find it surprising that one of the modern champions of the oppressed, in the farleft, anarchist sense was the psychiatrist and revolutionary the late Franz Fanon ( 1965) author of "The Wretched oh the Earth".
The past twenty years or so have seen a weakening of the conventional stereotype. The psychological problems of patiants a r e more frequently and readily recognised for what they are. Younger doctors, especially those who have studied in medical schools where a greater emphasis is put on psychological medicine and psychiatry, either treat the psychological problems of their patients or I hear from students, as I still do, of an antipsychiatry statement such as that of a clinical instr-uctor on a teaching round who replied when refer them much earlier for specialist help. When asked what he intended doing about the patient's obvious psychological and relevant clinical difficulties, "Look, forget all that psych crap. I don't know a thing about it and I get on fine.", my equanimity is unmoved. The instructor is one of a decreasing clan.
Indeed, the struggle is over for the establishment of psychiatry as a discipline within medicine. The medical anti-psychiatry stereotype of old is fast disappearing. This, by no means, is evidence that medical anti-psychiatry is truly on the wane. Intriguingly enough, in its place other manifestations are taking over and, what is more, are adopted by nonmedical factions.
The Ad-Psychiioay PwychWst
Outstanding among the contemporary features of the stereotype is the criticism of psychiatry by psychiatrists. Though long before Szasz (1961 Szasz ( , 1970 1) psychoanalysts (Glover, 1949) were inveighing against institutional psychiatry, it is he and others such as Laing (Boyers & Orrill, 1972) who nowadays command a vociferous following. Sociologists join in the cry (Goffman, 1968 ) as d o the scientologists. Thus, whilst anti-psychiatry of the old type is less evident, a currently fashionable disguised mode is used by doctors who, at the same time, are psychiatrists.
Roth ( 1972) has lucidly and trenchantly examined the criticism of psychiatry from those sources. H e rightly emphasises the growing contributions of psychiatry to the weal of the community. Yet the contemporary anti-psychiatry movement cannot be dismissed as wholly misguided. I n it is a core of well-justified concern for the person in his or her own right as man, woman, or child whose psyche, development, personality and liberty can be profoundly affected by impositions in the name of psychiatry and mental health. Greenland (1970) in his review of some of the effects of the historic British Mental Health Act of 1959, gives convincing evidence that too many people are still being committed to psychiatric hospitals under certificate who do not know, nor are they encouraged to discover how to use their legal rights. An extensive review of the world literature on psychosurgery by Breggin (1972a Breggin ( , 1972b ) draws attention t o the aplication of brain surgery to an increasing range of disorders. H e emphasises that it is the helpless and the weak, members of minorities, and the dominated who tend to be selected for psychosurgery. Practised indiscriminately, as apparently it can be, psychosurgery can be regarded as the apotheosis of current medical anti-psychiatry, affording the wider anti-psychiatry movement some of its cogency. Some of those psychiatrists who place a primary subjective value on the brain as the seat of the mind are in violent disagreement with psychosurgery and reject the implications for therapy that progress in neurophysiology may have to offer. This can force them into an unwitting antipsychiatric stance. An unhappy paradox thus occurs, and it is as such that the disguised stereotype is best seen. Their promotion of contractural or drop-out psychiatry leaves without help or support a vast number of patients, especially women, and members of both sexes at each end of the age scale.
A variant of this contemporary version of the medical stereotype, psychiatrists who hold antipsychiatric views, are the slugging matches between those who claim they represent psychiatric practice based on a n acceptable scientific medical model and those who maintain they are the true psychiatrists because they are concerned with psychological processes in a scientific manner. Clinical psycho-logists, especially those who expouse learning theory and behaviour therapy, have joined these fights in recent years. A typical example is Akiskal & McKinney's (1973) "Psychiatry and Pseudo-Psychiatry". It contains a lengthy, searing attack on what the authors call the "soft-headed camp" and a brief, mild criticism of the "tough-headed camp". Referring t o soft-heads they state: "The major defining characteristic of this group is their antibiological bias, resulting in various degrees of alienation from their medical backgrounds: and, in extreme form, culminating in a total abandonment of the canons of scientific reasoning, with heavy reliance on a primitive and anecdotal type of evidence". In another part of the article the authors state ex-cathedra: "With an increasing number of anti-intellectuals present among the faculty of psychiatry departments, they serve as models of identification for those residents who abhor the self-discipline implied in rigorous scientific methodology". Soft-heads adopt a psychosocial adaptational model rather than the toughheaded medical one, are concerned with the problems of living rather than a tough-headed biological approach, and practice psychotherapy and family therapy rather than use psychopharmacology, ECT, etc. A polarisation into psychological and apsychological approaches to its study, theory and practice, is evident in the early history of psychiatry. The contemporaiy twist is partly a reflection of the much larger speciality that psychiatry has become. Communication media facilitate the dissemination of polarised opinion 50 that it would appear that some psychiatrists, with some justification for believing it, for it is always possible t o find faults, regard the professional practice of some of their colleagues as simply not psychiatry. Without recognising it, both polarised groups have adopted an anti-psychiatric stereotype and with narcissistic undertones at that.
Unrealistic Expectations
Another disguised manifestation of the old stereotype is a seductive one. It seemingly affords psychiatric treatment greater power than it has. When the psychiatrist fails to produce unrealistically expected results the discipline and its practitioners are accused of ineffectiveness and ineptitude. The The blame, in the cases of the suicide of the patient in police custody and the failure of the ruse for psychiatric treatment for the woman who kept on exsanguinating herself, quoted earlier, was placed squarely on the psychiatrists involved. Unfortunately, psychiatrists themselves have aided and abetted magical ideas of psychiatry by extolling beyond justification the powers of psychotherapy or physical treatments. They set themselves up for a backlash response both from their colleagues, psychiatrists and other doctors, and from groups outside the medical profession. And this is when the psychiatric armamentarium is, in fact, so much more potent than it was. Anti-psychiatry promoted by nonmedical groups or organisations may reffect chang,es in public opinion and attitude that extend beyond the bounds of what can be legitimately regarded as psychiatry. Behaviour therapy and psychoanalysis are criticised as forcing willing victims to conform to an unhealthy society's values and standards. Physical therapies are ready-made targets for attack. Such organisations as PNP, People Not Psychiatry (Barnett, 1970) , reject professional psychiatry as inhuman, adopting and applying the principle that those with personal problems are most suited and effective in helping each other. This isolates a feature of what is common to many psychiatric therapies, especially the methods of group therapy evolved over the past three decades. Indeed, family psychiaCry, an emerging sub+ipeciality stemming from what was originally exclusive psychiatric research, advocates therapy in which family members help each other. PNP and other similar movements reject psychiatry yet owe it much for their inspiration though that would be denied.
Anti-Psychiatry and Anti-Medicine
Psychiatry, at the interface of medicine and society and the least popular of the specialities within medicine, is the most vulnerable aspect of medicine to attack. Anti-psychiatry invective such as patients being treated as objects and with inhumanity, can be more readily voiced and accepted than the treatment patients get in other specialities. After all, psychiatry deals with the sensitive core of the human experience. But the basic themes of antipsychiatric accusations are now being turned with growing confidence against the medical profession as a whole.
Irony strikes a note here. It is psychiatry more than any other branch of medicine that has contributed most to persuading doctors that their patients are persons, individuals, human beings. ( A great deal more has yet t o be done in this direction). Thus, it is probably highly significant that the antipsychiatric sentiment proposes that psychiatry is inhuman and authoritarian. Anti-psychiatry psychiatrists and other like members of the medical profession may well ponder whether they really do wish to support what in some respects is an antihuman and antimedical reaction.
A Speculative Conclusion
In conclusion I shall offer a brief speculative explanation of the medical anti-psychiatry stereotype: Before the advent of scientifically based medicine about 150 years ago, and indeed, until the turn of this century, doctors had hardly any specific therapies. What they did for their patients was explicitly or implicitly psychological, though if the problem presented as one of frank psychological and emotional difficulties, it was morally condemned and the patient regarded as unfit for medical attention. Even as recently as the 1939-45 World War members of the Royal Air Force who had such difficulties were rated as "lacking in moral fibre" and treated accordingly. In an era when doctors could devote themselves entirely to the urgencies of somatic medicine for the treatment of infectious diseases and such like, the psychiatrist was an awkward reminder that the ancient medicine of human relationships was still needed, but could be largely ignored in the triumphs and excitement of medical progress. But the successes of medicine, however, have served to highlight the fact that doctors d o have patients with psychological and psychiatric problems, and reveal the failure of the hard-won scientific concepts and erstwhile successful techniques of therapy to help those patients. Nowadays the growing excursion of psychiatry into the heart-lands of medicine, the teaching centres, is a reminder that potent though it is, modern medicine must increasingly take the psychological into account. Paediatrics is a good example of a branch of medicine that clearly understands the implications of this, and pays much attention to child psychiatry. By virtue of these trends, and the increased range and power of psychiatric treatments, a future for psychiatry such as that so chillingly described by Schiller (1972) can be only too easily imagined. This is yet another threatening change which evokes resistance. All of this is taking place in a changing social climate. It would have been unheard of a few years ago for a medical student to have said in a tutorial, "What I've learned is that your (he was referring to his group-mates) and my ideas, and feelings are the same as the patients we've been seeing". The patients suffered a wide spectrum of conditions from psychoses, through neuroses and psychosomatic syndromes to reactive states occasioned, for example, by end-stage renal failure or terminal carcinoma. That the patients had been perceived as people with empathy and acceptance by the students, and not as patient-objects, suggests that positive undercurrents are having an effect and that, perhaps, the medical anti-psychiatry stereotype in all its guises, is at last beginning to lose strength. To my mind this is all to the good.
What is intriguing is that anti-psychiatry is antimedical as well, and is being promoted with proselytising zeal by psychiatrists and nonmedical groups. Perhaps it represents a reaction to the enormous power of modern medicine and a recognition of medicine as a major social force.
